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1. Just a little bit of recent history about categories
1.1 Richard’s Montague semiotic program
During the 60’s and the 70’s, one of the great questions in the linguistic
discussion was the problem of how to establish the semantic component
of grammar. In this context it is not strange that some linguists turned
their looks toward those theories known as logical or categorial
grammars, in which the formal semantic component was well defined.
But, despite of the importance of the role played by the logical grammars
in the “semantic controversies” during the decade 1955-1965, they
didn’t influence substantially in the later developments, fundamentally in
those that were carried out in the generative frame. It is in this sense in
which it is necessary to interpret Gerald Gazd r’s and Geoffrey Pullum’s
following statement:
“Categorial grammars [...] have always had a somewhat marginal status in linguistics.
There has always been someone ready to champion them, but never enough people
actually using them to turn them into a paradigm. The currency they have [...] is due in
large measure to Montague, who based his semantic work on a modified categorial
grammar” (Gazdar & Pullum 1985).
This text implies some interesting considerations on the existent
relationship among Montague Grammar (MG) and Categorial Grammars
(CG). In the first place, Categorial Grammars are considered as
“marginal” grammatical formalisms, for what their linguistic interest is
scarce and not very significant, until the point of not having been able to
never become a grammatical paradigm. On the other hand, it stands out
the role played by Montague in the interest wakened up among the
linguists by Categorial Grammars, although it is considered that MG is
just a semantic theory.
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In fact, we can affirm that Richard Montague was the first one to
propose a coherent and articulate program applied to a formal
conception of syntax and semantics, for what his grammatical project
can be considered as the first formal grammar that establishes a
relationship between the syntactic and the semantic components of
grammar, conceived as the two inseparable faces of a coin.
The semiotic conception of “Universal Grammar” managed by
Montague stays in the basis of his grammatical project. For him,
universal grammar is not more than a mathematical frame able to
describe any definable system of symbols as a language, going from the
animal languages to human natural language, passing through formal
languages. It is for this he expressly manifests the biggest linking
between linguistics and mathematics in front of its relationship with
psychology (proposed by Chomsky), because the theoretical difference
between natural language and the languages of formal logic is not
important:
“There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between natural languages
and the artificial languages of logicians; indeed I consider it possible to comprehend
the syntax and semantics of both kinds of languages within a single natural and
mathematically precise theory” (Montague 1970, 1974:222).
The publication of the first works by Montague in the fifties coincides in
time with Chomsky’s generative theories and the emergence of
Transformational Generative Grammar (TGG) (Chomsky 1957). The
most relevant fact in connection with this coincidence is that MG
supplies a semantic and “pragmatic” analysis of the grammar in front of
the purely syntactic analysis of TGG. This probably explains the central
role played in the semantic controversies, in general, by logical
grammars and, specifically, by MG. This controversy took to the
reformulation of the c omskian theory into what has been denominated
the “standard theory” of TGG (Chomsky 1965). In the Standard Theory
the Katz-Postal thesis is assumed (Katz & Postal 1964) as a formal
explanation of the existent relationship between syntax and semantics,
quite different, however, of the basic proposals of MG.
The theories of Montague are mainly condensed in three articles
published in 1970 -and in that same year’s communication in the
Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics about the appropriate
treatment of the quantification in English (PTQ)-, just several months
before his death (Montague 1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1973). These theories
had an immediate influence in linguistics. In the decade of the seventies,
several volumes dedicated to MG appeared. This way, in 1974 the
summary of his main articles was published in charge of Richmond H.
Thomason (Montague 1974) and two years later Barbara Partee
published a volume on the montagovian semiotic program (Partee 1976).
The unconcluded project of Montague was recaptured at once by
different logicians and linguists, being carried out some doctoral
dissertations as (Bennett 1974) or (Cooper 1975). The comparisons
between MG and TGG were also developed in (Partee 1975) and in
(Bach 1979). Pragmatic developments of MG were also carried out in
this decade, like in (Karttunen & Peters 1978). But without a doubt, what
had a more important influence in the knowledge of Montague
grammatical program by linguists were the introductions and
applications of his theories: (Thomason 1974), (Halvorsen & Ladusaw
1979), (Dowty 1979); and, already in the decade of the 80’s, (Dowty,
Wall & Peters 1981), where the grammatical theory exposed in PTQ and
Intensional Logic - onceived as an intermediate language between
formal logic and natural language- are analyzed.
1.2 Some recent developments and applications of Montague Grammar
In the last twenty years, the Montague semiotic program has been
developed and applied with different purposes, as much in linguistics as
in logic and computational theory. MG has been taken as a reference
point in numerous works about categories, semantic theory and
discourse interpretation, as well as in some applications of logical
grammars in computational linguistics. Let us see briefly some of these
works.
In 1986, Johan van Benthem published an interesting book with some
essays on logical semantics (Benthem 1986). In this book, logical and
grammatical categories are an lyzed, as well as determiners, quantifiers,
conditionals, tense and modality, using MG as the starting point from
which the interpretation of sentence constituents is studied. The concept
of dynamic semantics (dynamics of interpretation) is introduced in the
CGs by means of the application of a Lambek Calculus in MG.
Just a couple of years later, two independent volumes were published
with different authors’ contributions on Categorial Grammar:
(Buszkowski, Marciszewski & Benthem 1988) and (Oehrle, Bach &
Wheeler 1988). In both of them, Montague Grammar plays a central role
in the application of CGs to the analysis of natural language. Different
logical aspects of these grammars are studied, such as the model
theoretical component of Categorial Grammars or the implementation of
Lambek Calculus applied to categories on the basis of MG, for instance.
In (Benthem 1991) the logical foundations of the CGs are presented in
connection with the interface between logic and linguistics (in particular,
the Theory of Generalized Quantifiers). For this, van Benthem chooses
MG to represent Categorial Grammars, extending it by means of
Lambda Calculus and the Theory of Types.
Another interesting point here is the proposed shift from CG to Dynamic
Logic, motivated by Computer Science and the computational treatment
of natural language. The technical setting for this shift lies in Modal
Logic and the semantics of possible worlds.
Finally, van Benthem’s book deals with the phenomenon of information
processing, where converge various logical paradigms such as
Relevance Logic, Modal Logic or Linear Logic, all of them directed
toward the structural and procedural aspects of information.
(Morrill 1994) incides in the semiotic conception of natural language
grammar by means of the proposal of a Type Logical Grammar (TLG).
The semiotic perspective of MG is opposed to Chomsky’s mentalist
perspective. In fact, this opposition is in the base of the difference
between a real formal logical grammar for natural language and the
chomskyan conception of a generative grammar in the present.
The aim of TLG is to generalise CG to a categorial logic. For this,
Morrill presents a refinement of Logical Grammar (Logical Syntax and
Model-theoretic semantics) “in which ‘logical’ applies not just to logical
semantics, but also to logical types directing derivation”. The bases of
Type Logical Grammar are:
1. Montague Grammar: a montagovian fragment for English.
2. The Theory of Types
3. A Gentzen Sequent Logic
4. Lambek Calculus (associative and non-associative).
5. Multimodal Systems and Labelled Deduction.
In this sense, TLG offers a wide framework in which some of the
applications of natural language logical analysis can be implemented: in
the level of semantic interpretation (Carpenter 1997), or in that of
discourse interpretation or even in that of the “pragmatic” theories about
inferences and semantic enrichment, what gives place to dynamic
conceptions of MG.
A frequently visited alternative in the nineties has been the opposition of
MG and the dynamic theories of meaning. The montagovian framework
has constantly been applied in diverse works related with the theory of
meaning and dynamic semantics during the last decade. As an
alternative, Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) arose at the
beginning of the eighties. It was proposed by Hans Kamp (Kamp 1981,
Kamp & Reyle 1993) with the purpose of explaining certain problems of
discourse interpretation that escaped to the MG environment.
The necessity to apply dynamic theories of interpretation in the
categorial frame was already outlined by Johan van Benthem, as it was
seen before. Other authors like (Gro nendijk & Stockhof 1987, 1991)
have proposed a dynamic treatment of Predicate Logic, enlarged with a
typologically structured language, lambda abstraction and Montague
Semantics. This is what they call a Dynamic Montague Grammar
(DMG).
But maybe the most direct proposal to give a representational treatment
of the dynamic discourse processes in MG is (Muskens 1996). The main
differences between DRT and MG rest in the fact that DRT is more
flexible to represent the discursive relationships; however, the
Compositional Principle, valid in MG, doesn’t hold in DRT. This
explains MG biggest elegance when dealing with quantification and
coordination phenomena, for example. And the interest to combine the
dinamicity of DRT with the compositionality of MG, what constitutes
the purpose of Muskens’ article.
The underlying logic to DRT is reducible to First Order Predicate Logic.
Muskens combines with this a classical Theory of Types Logic, based on
Church’s Lambda Calculus instead of Montague’s Intensional Logic:
“[...] we can have boxes [DRSs] and lambdas in one logic, and the combination of
these two [...] will allow us to assign boxes [DRSs] to English discourses in accordance
with Frege’s Principle: the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the
meaning of its parts” (Muskens 1996:144).
At the beginning of the nineties, Dov Gabbay began to develop a general
framework for programming and logic: Labeled Deductive Systems
(LDS), described in its formal aspects in (Gabbay 1996).
The purpose of LDS is to contribute a unified frame for the main logical
theories used in Logic Programming: Relevance Logic, Modal Logic,
Linear Logic, Temporal Logic, etc.
In (Gabbay & Kempson 1992, 1996) different aspects of natural
language are treated as the interpretation of anaphora, temporal
relationships and tense, structural dependences and the logical inferences
made in discourse, by means of the implementation in LDS of a
Categorial Grammar based on Montague Grammar.
The implementation of MG in LDS offers a powerful tool to analyze
what Gabbay and Kempson call “semantic enrichment”. Under this
denomination we find different linguistic phenomena -syntactic and
semantic ones- that intervene in communication, as well as certain
pragmatic aspects as the influence of context or of situation in the
interpretation of the diverse utterances that conform natural speech. In
this sense we can say that LDS becomes a MG-based alternative to the
semantics of situations and the semantics of possible worlds as well as to
DRT. We will have a look to it.
2. Applying MG to discourse analysis
2.1 The semiotic conception of grammar
As it has been said before, the implementation of MG in LDS permits a
categorial dynamic treatment of discourse. This is just one of the
different approaches to MG during the last decade of the 20th century;
but, in my opinion, the most interesting because of its simplicity and its
capacities for modelling linguistic phenomena.
One of the great advantages of CGs -and of MG, in particular- consists
in dealing with natural language from a semiotic perspective, thinking on
grammar as a device that allows us to distinguish between grammatical
symbol chains and non-grammatical symbol chains. In other words,
grammar is only a device to select a subset of symbol chains (those we
call grammatically correct) from the set of all the possible chains formed
by a given alphabet or vocabulary. From a logical point of view, a
grammar G of a language L is a set of rules and principles from which it
is possible, given a lexicon, to form every correct and meaningful
sentence of the language L. So, G can be considered as a deductive
system, being L the set of its theorems.
In this definition of grammar, information can be seen as the result of
natural language communication processes in which the hearer interprets
the speaker’s utterances by means of different but related inference
tasks: mainly a grammatical and a logical approach to the meaning of
utterances. Then, affording the analysis of natural language from a point
of view involving grammar as well as logic, makes us to be in
disposition of giving a general framework for utterance interpretation.
The grammatical approach involves the recognition of the lexicon and
the assignment of syntactic functions to the words. The logical approach
allows to establish certain meaning relations among the elements of a
speech act such as the words, the context and the logical presuppositions
that are assumed by the speaker and the hearer. So we have a complex
continuum for the interpretation of utterances that leads us from the
grammatical relations of the words to the logical deduction of
information that is not codified pr ma facie by grammar. We interpret
this continuum as a system of related databases each of them being a set
of lexical entries and its ca egorial types, and the system itself as a
logical device for the interpretation of natural language utterances.
We can consider that lexical entries are the minimal units of information
in the linguistic communication process (although this “lexicalist”
hypothesis could be discussed). But lexical meaning is not enough to
provide an interpretation of sentences. According to the Principle of
Composition, the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the
meanings of its parts and of the syntactic rules by which they are
combined. Therefore, the meaning of sentences depends on the meaning
of the words that are parts of them plus their combinatorial properties
and the contextual system where they are uttered.
The evident cases of “contextual sensitivity” are those sentences where
non-referential expressions appear. We call these expressions anaphoric
expressions or anaphora. Only by means of logical inferential
procedures, the hearer can determine the meaning of sentences of this
kind where anaphora plays a role in its interpretation. These inferential
procedures depend on certain semantic enrichment processes in which
speaker, hearer and context are important elements as well as lexical
meaning and system relations. Therefore, explaining the meaning of
natural language utterances from a formal perspective requires to
develop a logical framework of inference that includes those semantic
enrichment processes as a part of the logical inference itself. To put it in
a nutshell, we must establish a model of natural language interpretation
in terms of natural-deductive reasoning tasks, being necessary to explain
certain syntactic and semantic phenomena (v. gr.: the case of anaphora)
as logical deductive processes.
2.2 A logical device for utterance interpretation.
Labelled Deductive Systems (LDS) are a general computational
framework for inferential processes (Gabbay 1996). Its application to
natural language analysis as in (Gabbay & Kempson 1992) provides a
set of databases whose data are lexical entries (labels), everyone of them
being followed by an assigned categorial functional type that can be
interpreted in a logical way since functional types behave very much like
logical implications (Benthem 1991:35). Each database is labelled itself,
so it is possible to construct a map of related databases through some
labelling functions.
In more strict terms, an LDS is a pair <L,G>, where L is a logic and G is
an algebra with some operations on labels. The chosen logic L for the
analysis of natural language is the implicational fragment of a relevance
linear propositional logic such that a well formed formula (wff.) of logic
L is a formula that fulfills the following conditions:
1. e and t are wffs.
2. If A and B are wffs. then A®B is a wff.
3. Nothing more is a wff.
A correct expression ( r simply an expression) is a pair a:A, where aÎG
and A is a wff. The labels of the set G can be lexical entries of a certain
natural language (v.gr.: English or Spanish) and the wff. A, the
functional type corresponding to that lexical entry. A set of expressions
forms a database.
A deduction D in LDS consists in getting from some assumptions of the
form a1:A1,...an:An, where a1,...an are labels and A1,...An are
formulae, an expression of the form f(a1,...an):t, where f(a1,...an) is a
label obtained by combinatorial processes of a1,...an and t is the
formula representing the cat gorial type t obtained from A1,...An by
means of some rules defined in a natural deduction way.
We say a sentence of a natural language S is derived in LDS when we
show a deduction D in LDS such that its last expression is of the form
f(a1,...an):t, where f(a1,...an) is the formal functional counterpart of S.
Every assumption must be used in a deduction in LDS (relevance
requisite) and they must be used only once (linearity requisite). When
we derive by deduction in a database dk an xpression of the form a:t
and the relevance and linearity requisites are fulfilled, we say that dk is
closed. It is also possible to open a new database in any moment of the
deduction just making an assumption. This new database will be nested
in the previous open database.
Several databases can be related in a deduction. The relation is similar to
the accessibility relation among model sets in modal logic (Salguero
1991:57-60). Let Â be such a relation. Let De(dk) be the domain of the
database dk, that is to say, the set of referents of the expressions of type
e in dk. We say that for every two databases related by Â, th  population
of the first database is inherited by the second one. In symbols:
"didk[diÂdk Þ De(di)ÍDe(dk)]
This requisite of nested domains applied to LDS databases will be very
useful for certain cases of anaphora, as we will see in the next section.
The basic rules of LDS are the following:
R1. Application: For every two expressions a:A®BÎdk and b:AÎdn,
we can add to the actual database di an expression of the form a(b):B iff
either dkÂdnÂdi or dnÂdkÂdi.
R2. l-Abstraction: For every two expressions x:AÎdn and a(x):BÎdn,
where x:A is the only assumption of dn and a(x):B has been derived in
dn, if dkÂdn then lxa(x):A®BÎdk and dn is closed.
R3. l-Conversion: If lx[a(x)](b):AÎdk then a(b):AÎdk.
R4. Reutilization: For every expression a:AÎDe(dk) we can add this
expression to another database dn iff dkÂdn.
The rules of Application and l-Abstraction are the labelled forms of
classical propositional logic rules of elimination (Modus Ponen ) and
introduction of the implicational connective. Nevertheless, the rule of l-
Conversion is a rule operating only in the label, leaving the formula in
the expression untouched.
Databases so conceived are in many aspects like possible worlds. For
example, we can see them as moments, interpreting databases in a
temporal manner. Or, much better, as states of knowledge of the
speaker/hearer of a natural language sentence, almost like an information
state in the kripkean sense of the term. This makes possible to interpret
the expressions in a database like the theorems that hold in a model set
(Hintikka set). Therefore, for every expression ai:Ai appearing in a
database dk, we will say that dk |- ai:Ai.
It is important the characterization of the relation Â f r making the
system more or less powerful. The best charac erization of Â for our
proposals is as a partial order, viz.: Â is a reflexive, antisymmetric,
transitive and connected relation. This makes the concept of LDS
databases closer to the kripkean concept of information state. So, a
database contains not just the information of the expressions belonging
to it, but also the information derived from the expressions belonging to
“previous” information states and the information to be derived in the
database itself.
So, what we have is that LDS allows to construct a database where all
the lexical information of a natural language available in a certain
moment for a speaker/hearer is put. This information is mainly a label
and a functional type (and maybe an ordering) for each lexical entry. So,
given such a database, it is possible to manipulate the information into it
with rules defined in function of the needed logic in order to increase the
database. As every functional type is interpreted as a ca gorial logical
type, LDS provides a parser that assigns a structured database to every
grammatically correct sequence of words as its interpretation.
2.3 The treatment of anaphoric expressions: context and presuppositions
We consider an anaphora is any expression in the discourse whose
meaning does not depend on the expression itself, but on another
expression in the discourse to which the anaphora is (grammatically)
related. The scope where an anaphora finds its reference does not
necessarily correspond to the sentence in which it appears. Moreover,
anaphoric expressions usually find their reference in other sentences or
even in extralinguistic context presuppositions.
There are different types of anaphora. When we talk about anaphora, we
can be talking about pronominal anaphora, relative clauses, definite and
indefinite noun phrases, verb phrase anaphora, tense (and aspect)
anaphora or, even, ellipsis. However, in this paper we will only deal with
some types of anaphora. On the one hand we have those anaphoric
expressions like pronouns, relative clauses and noun phrases,
expressions that look for their reference in other expressions in the
discourse provided a certain kind of quantification is involved. On the
other hand we have verb phrase anaphora, tense, aspect and ellipsis,
where the problem is not variable instantiation, at least not in the same
sense. Let us analyze the former ones.
We can distinguish several kinds of pronominal anaphora. For example,
we have correferential pronouns as in the sentence:
(1) John loves Mary. Shehates him.
The simple logical form of (1) is:
[1] love(m,j)Ù$xyhate(y,x)
Applying an LDS analysis to (1) we have two related databases d1 nd
d2 such that d1=<john’:e, love’:e®(e®t), mary’:e> and d2=<xshe’:e
hate’:e®(e®t), yhim’:e>. If we apply the rules of our calculus to d1 we
get:
d1=<john’:e, love’:e®(e®t), mary’:e, love(mary)’:e®t,
love(mary)(john)’:t>
But, what about applying the rules of the calculus to d2? Remember we
have got a quantified formula as its logical form. This means we must
care about the existential presuppositions that lie under the sentence
“She hates him” to get its interpretation.
As we have seen, LDS databases are like possible worlds in several
aspects. So we can treat them as though they were model sets. To these
model sets we can apply certain individuating functions that preserve the
reference of variables in intensional contexts (Salguero 1991:130-139).
Moreover, we can add certain marks to the labels of our assumptions to
preserve certain referential aspects of lexicon as gender, for instance.
These marks on the labels in a deduction can be treated as individuating
functions applied to the lexicon. For example, let De be the set of
denotations of all the expressions of type e in English (the domain of
discourse), being De(dk) a proper subset of De whose members are the
expressions of type e that appear in the database dk (the population of
dk) such that for every database dn, if dkÂdn then De(dk)ÍDe(dn) by
the requisite of nested domains and let f be the individuating function for
feminine words in English. This function assigns to every expression
aÎDe the value 1 if and only if a is a lexical feminine entry in an
English lexicon. Otherwise its value is 0. Then we can add a restriction
to the reutilization rule imposing the condition for the instantiation of a
l-bound variable x that f(xÎDe(dn))=f(aÎDe(dk)) and dkÂdn. In our
example, f(xshe’:eÎd2)=mary’:eÎd1, f(yhim’:eÎd2)=john’:eÎd1 and
d1Âd2.
By applying this restriction and the rules of the calculus to d2 we obtain:
d2=<xshe’:e hate’:e®(e®t), yhim’:e, f(xshe)=mary’:e, f(yhim)=john’:e,
hate(john)’:e®t, hate(john)(mary)’:t>
This database is an abbreviated way to write the whole database d2,
where the individuating function f introduces a l-abstraction process in
the derivation as follows:
d2=<xshe’:e hate’:e®(e®t), yhim’:e, d3,
lxshe[lyhim[hate(yhim)](xshe)]’:e®(e®t), mary’:e,
lxshe[lyhim[hate(yhim)](xshe)](mary)’:e®t,
lyhim[hate(yhim)(mary)]’:e®t, john’:e,
lyhim[hate(yhim)(mary)](john)’:t, hate(john)(mary)’:t>
where d3 is:
d3=<xshe’:e, d4, lyhim[hate(yhim)]’:e®(e®t),
lyhim[hate(yhim)](xshe)’:e®t>
where d4 is:
d4=<yhim’:e, hate(yhim)’:e®t>
and d2Âd3Âd4. For a more detailed discussion see (Salguero 1994).
A second type of pronominal anaphora are pronominal variables bound
by a quantifier. The following sentence is an example:
(2) Every student is proud of his work.
We can get two different logical forms of (2) related to its two different
interpretations:
[2] "x$y(student(x)Ùwork(y)Ùbelong(x,y)®be_proud(y,x))
[2’] "x$yz(student(x)Ùwork(y)Ùbelong(z,y)®be_proud(y,x))
In both cases, the reference of the anaphoric expression “his” depends on
a quantifier, either a universal or an existential one. The reference of the
anaphora is a function again, but this time the function takes its value
from the whole domain the quantifiers are operating over:
f(xhisÎDe(d1)=g({w | wÎDe})
The difference between the interpretations [2] and [2’] is a certain
restriction on the function g. While interpretation [2] requires that
||lx[student(x)](a)||=1 for every aÎDe such that g(w)=a, interpretation
[2’] only requires that De¹Æ. That is to say, [2] requires a real
individuating function but [2’] only an existential presupposition.
The treatment of relative clauses is similar to the treatment of
pronominal anaphora. The sentence
(3) John loves Mary who hates him.
is analyzed in LDS in the same way we nalyzed the sentence (1). The
only difference is that in the analysis of (1) we have got two main related
databases d1 and d2 and a number of nested databases in d2 obtained
from several processes of l-abstraction, while in the analysis of (2) we
have a single set of nested databases: its derivation is very similar to a
natural calculus derivation with several auxiliary hypothesis. The
restrictions applied in the analysis of (1) are applied in the analysis of (3)
to obtain the reference of the anaphoric expressions.
An important type of pronominal anaphora are the well known indirectly
bound pronouns whose best examples are the “donkey sentences”:
(4) Everyone who owns a donkey beats it.
Its logical form is:
[4] "xy(donkey(y)Ùown(y,x)®beat(y,x))
In (4) we have a similar case to the previous ones. Its peculiarity consists
in that the reference of the anaphoric expression “it” depends on the
reference of the indefinite noun phrase “a donkey” in the same database,
whose reference depends on the relative “who”, whose reference
depends on the quantifier “everyone”. So, we have a very good example
of a complex process of inference from logical instantiation of non-
referential variables.
The behavior of an indefinite noun phrase as “a donkey” is somehow
identical to the b havior of a quantified predicative sentence. The same
is true for definite noun phrases as “the donkey”. In [4] we have a
universal quantification of the anaphoric variable induced by the
universal quantification under whose scope the noun phrase is. It would
have been possible the alternative existential logical analysis:
[4’] "x$y(donkey(y)Ùown(y,x)®beat(y,x))
In any case, we have got a problem of existential presupposition as we
had in the analysis of (2) above. Therefore, the peculiar problems that
arise from the analysis of indirectly bound pronouns are treated in LDS
as a set of instantiation tasks of anaphoric expression as we did in (1)
and (2), and the whole problem is reduced to the definition of the
corresponding individuating functions.
2.4 The treatment of anaphoric expressions: pronominal relations,
relative clauses and dependencies
LDS explains in a very natural way certain phenomena related to the use
of pronouns. This is the case of object reduplication in some romance
languages like Italian or Spanish. Consider, for example, the following
Spanish sentence
(5) Juan le dio una rosa a María
John her-Dat. gave a rose-Ac. Mary-Dat.
“John gave a rose to Mary”
The personal pronoun “le” is related to “María”. Both words are in
dative case while “una rosa” is accusative, playing the role of the direct
object of the transitive verb “dio”. The question is: have we got in the
sentence (5) two indirect objects or just one spli ted indirect object? It is
hard to see the phenomenon as a splitted object since the following two
sentences are both grammatically correct in Spanish:
(6) Juan le dio una rosa
“John gave her a rose”
(7) Juan dio una rosa a María
“John gave a rose to Mary”
So it is a case of double indirect object, only possible because the
reference of the anaphora “le” is the same individual than the reference
of the name “María”: the person we call Mary. The derivation of (5) in
LDS is not a problem:
d1=<Juan’:e, xle’:e, dar’:e®(e®(e®t)), una_rosa’:e, a_María’:e, d2,
lxle[dar(una_rosa)(xle)]’:e®(e®t),
lxle[dar(una_rosa)(xle)](a_María)’:e®t, dar(una_rosa)(a_María)’:e®t,
dar(una_rosa)(a_María)(Juan)’:t>
where d2 is
d2=<xle’:e, dar(una_rosa)’:e®(e®t), dar(una_rosa)(xle)’:e®t>
In this derivation we do not need use the rule of reutilization because its
role is played in the sentence itself by the duplicated object. Then, the
name “María” is directly instantiating the anaphora “le” in the same
database without any outer reference being needed.
Relatives are well known anaphoric expressions too. In many aspects,
they are like pronominal anaphora, but there is an important
characteristic that makes them to be different: relative clauses introduce
a subordinate sentence, so they are a part of a different database than the
rest of the sentence where its antecedent is. Therefore, relative anaphora
is a control label that ever imposes the opening of a new nested database
in a LDS deduction. This database is closed when we reach an
expression of type t as usual. Let the following sentence be an example:
(8) Mary loves John who hates her
Its deduction in LDS is very similar to the previous ones except for the
fact that the relative “who” works as a new database control:
d1=<Mary’:e, love’:e®(e®t), John’:e, d2, love(John)’:e®t,
love(John)(Mary)’:t>
where d2 is
d2=<xwho’:e, hate’:e®(e®t), xher’:e, d3,
lxwho[hate(Mary)(xwho)]’:e®t, John’:e,
lxwho[hate(Mary)(xwho)](John)’:t, hate(Mary)(John)’:t>
and d3 is
d3=<xwho’:e, d4, lxher[hate(xher)]’:e®(e®t), Mary’:e,
lxher[hate(xher)](Mary)’:e®t, hate(Mary)’:e®t, hate(Mary)(xwho)’:t>
and d4 is
d4=<xher’:e, hate(xher)’:e®t>
This treatment of the relative clauses differs from the treatment in
(Gabbay & Kempson, 1992). Like them, we consider the anaphora
“xwho” is a control label that tell us it is necessary to open a new
database. But this database is nested in the original one, not linked to it
by a function on the antecedent of the anaphora. Otherwise, we could not
save the order of words in the deduction of the following sentence:
(9) John, who hates Mary, loves Susan
The derivation of (9) in LDS is easily comparable to the derivation of
(8):
d1=<John’:e, d2, love’:e®(e®t), Susan’:e, love(Susan)’:e®t,
love(Susan)(John)’:t>
where d2 is
d2=<xwho’:e, hate’:e®(e®t), Mary’:e, d3,
lxwho[hate(Mary)(xwho)]’:e®t, John’:e,
lxwho[hate(Mary)(xwho)](John)’:t, hate(Mary)(John)’:t>
and d3 is
d3=<xwho’:e, hate(Mary)’:e®t, hate(Mary)(xwho)’:t>
This treatment allows us to maintain the order of words in the deduction,
deriving in the first place the relative subordinate sentence and then the
main one, what is closer to the process of information decodif cation by
the hearer than deriving the main sentence first and then the subordinate
one as a linked database.
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